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Abstract
A Bayesian game is a game of incomplete information in which the rules of the game
are not fully known to all players. We consider the Bayesian game of Battle of Sexes that
has several Bayesian Nash equilibria and investigate its outcome when the underlying prob-
ability set is obtained from generalized Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen experiments. We find that
this probability set, which may become non-factorizable, results in a unique Bayesian Nash
equilibrium of the game.
1 Introduction
The standard approach to constructing quantum games [1–56] naturally uses the formalism of
quantum mechanics in Hilbert space [57]. In recent years, however, a probabilistic approach
to this research area [27, 38, 47–49, 51–53] has been proposed that uses sets of non-factorizable
quantum mechanical probabilities, i.e. without using the quantum mechanical concepts of state
vectors, self-adjoint operators, and quantum measurement etc. This is with a view of making the
area of quantum games more accessible to wider mathematical application, as the methods and
range of solution concepts of game theory [58–61] are used and exploited, without any real need
for invoking the Hilbert space formalism of quantum mechanics.
The probabilistic approach for a two-player two-strategy game directly uses sets of quantum
probabilities corresponding to the measurement outcomes on a two qubit quantum system. As is
known, the setting of generalized Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (EPR) experiments [62–70] performed
on this system leads to the consideration of a set of 16 quantum probabilities. Properties of this
probability set have been investigated by Cereceda [70] and it has been pointed out that the CHSH
form of Bell’s inequality [69] can be re-expressed in terms of constraints on the elements from this
set. It is observed that only a non-factorizable probability set, as is defined later, can lead to
the violation of Bell’s inequality and that not every non-factorizable probability set violates Bell’s
inequality.
A Bayesian game is a game of incomplete information in which the rules of the game are
not fully known to all players. In this paper, we study a Bayesian game that is a variant of
the well known Battle of Sexes game, also studied [11, 35] in the quantum game literature. In
an earlier study [35], using the quantization protocol based on Schmidt decomposition [57], a
Bayesian game of incomplete information [61] has been investigated in relation to the violation
of Bell’s inequality [57, 64–67]. The present paper, however, adopts a different approach in that,
without referring to the Hilbert space formalism, it finds the outcome of a Bayesian game when the
considered probability set can be non-factorizable—this can arise, in an experimental situation,
from a set up involving quantum entanglement, such as an EPR-type experiment, where the CHSH
form of Bell’s inequality is violated.
In its normal form representation, the game matrix of the Bayesian game has the same number
of entries as the 16 elements εi in the probability set that corresponds to the generalized EPR
experiments [70]. We find that the richer structure of the Bayesian game permits a natural
embedding of the classical factorizable game within the quantum game. We show that, whereas
the classical factorizable Bayesian game of imperfect information has several Nash equilibria, its
non-factorizable quantum version obtained from a set of quantum probabilities corresponding to
generalized EPR experiments has a unique Nash equilibrium.
The suggested probabilistic approach to obtaining quantum games thus re-expresses players’
payoff relations in terms of a set of probabilities that can also arise in a quantum mechanical
experiment. As the approach is based on probabilities only, it does not refer to the formalism of
quantum mechanics using state vectors, unitary transformations, and quantum measurements etc.
As game theory is a broad area, with applications ranging from trade, politics, sociology, biology,
engineering etc., most researchers in this area are naturally not familiar with the mathematical
formalism of quantum mechanics. This paper thus fills in that gap and demonstrates how an un-
usual game-theoretic outcome for a Bayesian game results when probability sets that are obtained
in quantum mechanical experiments are the underlying probabilities of a Bayesian game. In this
approach, the quantum game reduces itself to the classical game when the considered probability
set becomes factorizable.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Sections 2-3 present a review of the classical
theory of a Bayesian game that is a variant of the game of Battle of Sexes. Section 4 describes
quantum probabilities in generalized EPR experiments, their constraints, and how within the
quantum game the players’ payoff relations are defined in terms of these probabilities. Section 5
analyses the outcome of the Bayesian game of Battle of Sexes with EPR probabilities and Section 6
discusses the results.
2 The Bayesian game of Battle of Sexes and its variant
The game of Battle of Sexes (BoS) describes [61] the following situation. Two people Alice and
Bob wish to go out together and two concerts are available: one with music by Bach, and one
with music by Stravinsky. One person prefers Bach and the other prefers Stravinsky. If they go
to different concerts, each of them is equally unhappy listening to the music of either composer.
The situation is represented by the following matrix
Alice
B
S
Bob
B S(
(2, 1) (0, 0)
(0, 0) (1, 2)
)
, (1)
where Bach and Stravinsky are represented by symbols B and S, respectively. For this game, a
Nash equilibrium (NE) is a pair of strategies such that each player’s strategy is the best reply
to the strategic choice of the other players. In other words, unilateral deviation from a Nash
equilibrium by a player in the form of a different choice of strategy will produce a payoff that is
less than or equal to what a Nash equilibrium strategy will give to that player. Analysis shows [61]
that this game has three mixed strategy Nash equilibria (0, 0) , (23 ,
1
3 ), (1, 1), where the numbers
in parentheses are the Alice’s and Bob’s probabilities of choosing the strategy B.
An interesting variant of this game [61] is the one in which Alice is unsure whether Bob prefers
to join her or prefers to avoid her, whereas Bob knows Alice’s preferences. Assume that Alice
thinks that with probability 12 Bob wants to go out with her, and with probability
1
2 Bob wants
to avoid her,
Alice playing against Bob’s two types
probability 12
B
S
B S(
(2, 1) (0, 0)
(0, 0) (1, 2)
)
Bob’s first type
probability 12
B
S
B S(
(2, 0) (0, 2)
(0, 1) (1, 0)
)
.
Bob’s second type
(2)
That is, from Alice’s perspective, Bob has two possible types, the first is shown on the left and
the second is on the right in (2).
Alice does not know Bob’s type and is thus faced with the situation of choosing her rational
action that is based on her belief about the action of Bob of each type. Given these beliefs, and
her belief about the likelihood of each type, she can calculate her expected payoff in each case.
For instance, given that Alice plays B, and Bob of first type (who wishes to meet Alice) plays B
whereas Bob of second type (who wishes to avoid Alice) plays S, then Alice’s expected payoff is
1
2 (2) +
1
2 (0) = 1.
There are 4 possible pairs of actions of Bob’s two types given as (B,B), (B,S), (S,B), and
(S,S). Here, for instance, (S,B) describes that Bob’s first type plays S and Bob’s second type
plays B. Players’ expected payoffs are then obtained as given below.
Alice
Bob’s two types
(B,B) (B,S) (S,B) (S,S)
B (2, 12 ) (1, 32 ) (1, 0) (0, 1)
S (0, 12 ) (12 , 0) (12 , 32 ) (1, 1)
. (3)
One can then show [61] that the triplet (B, (B,S)), where the first entry in the bracket is Alice’s
action B and (B,S) is the pair of actions of the two types of Bob, constitutes a Nash equilibrium.
This is a pure strategy Nash equilibrium consisting of three actions, one for Alice and one for each
of the two types of Bob, with the property that a) Alice’s action is optimal given the actions of
the two types of Bob, b) the action of each type of Bob is optimal given the action of Alice.
3 Battle of Sexes with imperfect information
We now consider a situation in which neither player knows whether the other wants to meet or
not [61]. As before, Alice assumes that Bob will prefer to join her with probability 12 and will
prefer to avoid her with probability 12 . Moreover, Bob expects with probability ω Alice will prefer
to join him and with probability (1−ω) that she will prefer to avoid him. It is assumed that both
Alice and Bob know their own preferences. The game can be represented as shown in Fig. 1 [61].
Consider the payoffs of Alice of type 1. She believes that with probability 12 she faces Bob of
type 1 and with probability 12 she faces Bob of type 2. Assume that Bob of type 1 chooses B and
Bob of type 2 chooses S. Then if Alice of type 1 chooses B, her expected payoff is 12 (2)+ 12 (0) = 1
and if she chooses S, her expected payoff is 12 (0) + 12 (1) = 12 .
We represent the action of the two types of Bob by the pairs (B,B), (B,S), (S,B), (S,S),
where the first entry in the bracket is the action of Bob of type 1 and the second entry is the
action of Bob of type 2. The expected payoff to Alice of type 1 when she chooses B or S, against
the 4 pairs of actions of the two types of Bob are
Alice of type 1
Bob’s two types
(B,B) (B,S) (S,B) (S,S)
B 2 1 1 0
S 0 12 12 1
, (4)
and similarly the payoff to Alice of type 2 is found as
Figure 1: The game of Battle of Sexes when each player is unsure of other player’s preferences [61].
Alice of type 2
Bob’s two types
(B,B) (B,S) (S,B) (S,S)
B 0 1 1 2
S 1 12 12 0
. (5)
Consider the case when Alice of type 1 plays B, Alice of type 2 plays S, Bob of type 1 plays
S, and Bob of type 2 plays B. We represent this case by the quadruple (B,S), (S,B) where the
entries in the first pair are chosen by Alice’s two types, respectively, and the entries in the second
pair are chosen by Bob’s two types, respectively. For this quadruple, the payoffs to Alice’s two
types can be found from (4,5) at the entries located at the intersection of the same column with
entry (S,B) and the two row entries at B and S corresponding to Alice of type 1 and type 2,
respectively:
ΠA1 {(B,S), (S,B)} = 1, ΠA2 {(B,S), (S,B)} =
1
2
, (6)
where the subscripts 1 & 2 for A or B give the type of that player.
The following table gives the expected payoffs to Alice’s two types against the pairs of actions
(B,B), (B,S), (S,B), (S,S) by Bob’s two types, respectively
Alice’s two types
Bob’s two types
(B,B) (B,S) (S,B) (S,S)
(B,B) (2, 0) (1, 1) (1, 1) (0, 2)
(B,S) (2, 1) (1, 12 ) (1, 12 ) (0, 0)
(S,B) (0, 0) (12 , 1) (12 , 1) (1, 2)
(S,S) (0, 1) (12 , 12 ) (12 , 12 ) (1, 0)
, (7)
where in the column on the left, for instance, (B,S) means that Alice of type 1 chooses B and Alice
of type 2 chooses S. The two payoff entries in brackets are the expected payoffs to Alice of type 1
and type 2, respectively. In (7) consider the entry (12 , 1) at the intersection of 3rd row (S,B) and
3rd column (S,B). This means that Alice of the types 1 and 2 chooses S and B, respectively, and
Bob of the types 1 and 2 also chooses S and B, respectively. The payoff to Alice of type 1 and
type 2 are 12 and 1, respectively.
Similarly, the payoffs to Bob’s two types can be found as
ΠB1 {(B,S), (S,B)} = ω(0) + (1− ω)(2) = 2(1− ω), (8)
ΠB2 {(B,S), (S,B)} = ω(0) + (1− ω)(1) = 1− ω, (9)
and one can write the expected payoffs to Bob’s first type as
Bob’s type 1
Alice’s two types
(B,B) (B,S) (S,B) (S,S)
B 1 ω 1− ω 0
S 0 2(1− ω) 2ω 2
, (10)
and, similarly, the expected payoffs to Bob’s second type are obtained as
Bob’s type 2
Alice’s two types
(B,B) (B,S) (S,B) (S,S)
B 0 1− ω ω 1
S 2 2ω 2(1− ω) 0
. (11)
As it is the case for payoffs to Alice’s two types above, (10) and (11) can be joined together to
obtain the payoffs to Bob’s two types as
Alice’s two types
Bob’s two types
(B,B) (B,S) (S,B) (S,S)
(B,B) (1, 0) (1, 2) (0, 0) (0, 2)
(B,S) (ω, 1− ω) (ω, 2ω) (2(1− ω), (1− ω)) (2(1− ω), 2ω)
(S,B) ((1 − ω), ω) ((1− ω), 2(1− ω)) (2ω, ω) (2ω, 2(1− ω))
(S,S) (0, 1) (0, 0) (2, 1) (2, 0)
,
(12)
where the entries in brackets are the expected payoffs to Bob of type 1 and type 2, respectively.
Now, (7) and (12) can be joined together to obtain
Alice
Bob
(B,B) (B,S) (S ,B) (S ,S)
(B,B) (2, 0), (1, 0) (1, 1), (1, 2) (1, 1), (0, 0) (0, 2), (0, 2)
(B,S) (2, 1), (ω, 1− ω) (1, 12 ), (ω, 2ω) (1,12 ), (2(1− ω), (1 − ω)) (0, 0), (2(1− ω), 2ω)
(S ,B) (0, 0), ((1− ω), ω) ( 12 , 1), ((1− ω), 2(1− ω)) ( 12 , 1), (2ω, ω) (1, 2), (2ω, 2(1− ω))
(S ,S) (0, 1), (0, 1) (12 ,
1
2 ), (0, 0) (
1
2 ,
1
2 ), (2, 1) (1, 0), (2, 0)
(13)
where, for the two pairs of payoff entries, the first pair is for Alice’s two types and the second payoff
pair is for Bob’s two types. It can be seen that when ω = 23 , for instance, the strategy quadru-
ples {(S,B), (S,S)} and {(B,B), (B,S)} corresponding to the payoff quadruples (1, 2), (43 , 23 ) and
(1, 1), (1, 2), respectively, are the pure strategy Bayesian Nash equilibria [60, 61].
3.1 Mixed-strategy version
Now consider the mixed-strategy version of the game in which the players’ probabilities of selecting
B from the pure strategies B & S are given by numbers p, q, p′, and q′ ∈ [0, 1] for Alice of type 1,
Alice of type 2, Bob of type 1, and for Bob of type 2, respectively. The mixed-strategy payoffs for
Alice’s and Bob’s two types can then be found from Fig. 1 as
ΠA1(p; p
′, q′) =
1
2
(
p
1− p
)T (
2 0
0 1
)(
p′
1− p′
)
+
1
2
(
p
1− p
)T (
2 0
0 1
)(
q′
1− q′
)
,
ΠA2(q; p
′, q′) =
1
2
(
q
1− q
)T (
0 2
1 0
)(
p′
1− p′
)
+
1
2
(
q
1− q
)T (
0 2
1 0
)(
q′
1− q′
)
,
ΠB1(p
′; p, q) = ω
(
p
1− p
)T (
1 0
0 2
)(
p′
1− p′
)
+ (1− ω)
(
q
1− q
)T (
1 0
0 2
)(
p′
1− p′
)
,
ΠB2(q
′; p, q) = ω
(
p
1− p
)T (
0 2
1 0
)(
q′
1− q′
)
+ (1− ω)
(
q
1− q
)T (
0 2
1 0
)(
q′
1− q′
)
,
(14)
where T is for transpose and the subscripts 1 and 2 under A and B refer to the respective player’s
type. Also, a semicolon is used to separate Alice’s and Bob’s variables. The following Nash
inequalities are then obtained
ΠA1(p
∗; p′∗, q′∗)−ΠA1(p, p′∗, q′∗) =
∂ΠA1
∂p
|∗ (p∗ − p) =
{
3
2
(p′∗ + q′∗)− 1
}
(p∗ − p) ≥ 0,
ΠA2(q
∗; p′∗, q′∗)−ΠA2(q, p′∗, q′∗) =
∂ΠA2
∂q
|∗ (q∗ − q) = 2 {1− (p′∗ + q′∗)} (q∗ − p) ≥ 0,
ΠB1(p
′∗; p∗, q∗)−ΠB1(p′; p∗, q∗) =
∂ΠB1
∂p′
|∗ (p′∗ − p′) = {3ωp∗ + 3(1− ω)q∗ − 2} (p′∗ − p′) ≥ 0,
ΠB2(q
′∗; p∗, q∗)−ΠB2(q′; p∗, q∗) =
∂ΠB2
∂q′
|∗ (q′∗ − q′) = −{3ωp∗ + 3(1− ω)q∗ − 1} (q′∗ − q′) ≥ 0,
(15)
where the quadruple {(p∗, q∗), (p′∗, q′∗)} is the Nash equilibrium strategy set, which is indicated
by use of the asterisk label. From the inequalities (15), at ω = 23 , for instance, the pure Bayesian
Nash equilibria quadruples can be identified as {(0, 1), (0, 0)} and {(1, 1), (1, 0)}, which correspond
to the strategy quadruples {(S,B), (S,S)} and {(B,B), (B,S)} as can be observed above. Also,
it is observed that
{
(12 , 1), (
2
3 , 0)
}
, for instance, is a mixed-strategy Bayesian Nash equilibrium at
which the players’ payoffs are obtained from Eqs. (14) as
ΠA1(
1
2
;
2
3
, 0) =
2
3
, ΠA2(1;
2
3
, 0) =
4
3
,
ΠB1(
2
3
;
1
2
, 1) =
2
3
, ΠB2(0;
1
2
, 1) = 2− ω. (16)
4 Quantum probabilities in generalized Einstein-Podolsky-
Rosen experiments
The above analysis of mixed-strategy Bayesian Nash equilibria assumes the underlying probabili-
ties to be factorizable. We now would like to know whether the outcome of the Bayesian game from
Fig. 1 is affected when the probabilities become non-factorizable. For this we would consider the
set of non-factorizable quantum probabilities obtained from generalized EPR experiments. The
standard setting of such experiments [57,62–70] involves a large number of runs. Two halves of an
EPR pair originate from the same source travelling in opposite directions. One half is received by
observer 1 whereas observer 2 receives the other half. The two observers are space like separated
and are unable to communicate.
As Fig. 2 shows, the two directions refer to two possible directions along which measurements
can be taken and in a run the spin or polarization of the received half is measured. We call D1 and
D2 observer 1’s two directions and D
′
1 and D
′
2 observer 2’s two directions. In a run, each observer
selects one direction and thus a directional pair from (D1, D
′
2), (D1, D
′
1), (D2, D
′
1), (D2, D
′
2) is
selected by the observers in that run. The Stern-Gerlach type detectors are now rotated along
these selected directions to perform the quantum measurement. Independent of which directional
pair is chosen by the two observers, the outcome of the quantum measurement is either +1 or −1
along a measurement direction.
The relevant 16 probabilities are given [70] in the following,
Observer 1
D1
+1
−1
D2
+1
−1
Observer 2
D′1
+1 −1
D′2
+1 −1

ε1 ε2
ε3 ε4
ε5 ε6
ε7 ε8
ε9 ε10
ε11 ε12
ε13 ε14
ε15 ε16

, (17)
Figure 2: Figure 2: The setting for generalized Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen experiments. We asso-
ciate Alice’s two directions to the two types of Alice i.e. D1 ∼Alice’s type 1 and D2 ∼Alice’s type
2. Similarly, D′1 ∼Bob’s type 1 and D′2 ∼Bob’s type 2.
where, for instance, when the observer 1 selects the direction D2 and observer 2 selects the direc-
tion D′1, and the Stern-Gerlach detectors are rotated along these directions, the probability that
both experimental outcomes are −1 is ε12 and the probability that the observer 1’s experimental
outcome is +1 and observer 2’s experimental outcome is −1 is given by ε10. Appendix A described
how the probabilities εj are obtained from a pure state of two qubits.
We note that there are 16 probabilities in the above setting of generalized EPR experiments and
that the Fig. 1 giving a normal form representation of a Bayesian game of incomplete information
also has the same number of entries in it. This naturally leads us to consider the situation in
which the EPR probabilities are taken as the underlying probabilities of the strategy pairs in the
Bayesian game in Fig. 1.
Now, the EPR probabilities can become non-factorizable. As we see in the following, this
consideration motivates us to investigate how the outcome of the Bayesian game is affected when
the underlying probabilities of this game are obtained from EPR experiments and can thus become
non-factorizable.
4.1 Constraints on EPR probabilities and defining the payoff relations
The elements of the probability set εj (1 ≤ j ≤ 16) are known to satisfy certain other constraints
that are described as follows. Note that when the directional pair (D1, D
′
2) is chosen for all runs of
the experiment, the only possible outcomes are (+1,+1), (+1,−1), (−1,+1), (−1,−1). The same
is true for other directional pairs (D1, D
′
1), (D2, D
′
1), (D2, D
′
2). This leads to the normalization
constraint:
∑4
j=1 εj = 1 =
∑8
j=5 εj ,
∑12
j=9 εj = 1 =
∑16
j=13 εj . (18)
Also, in a particular run of the EPR experiment, the outcome of +1 or −1 (obtained along the
direction D1 or direction D2) is independent of whether the direction D
′
1 or the direction D
′
2 is
chosen in that run. Similarly, the outcome of +1 or −1 (obtained along D′1 or D′2) is independent
of whether the direction D1 or the direction D2 is chosen in that run. These requirements, when
translated in terms of the probability set εj are expressed as
ε1 + ε2 = ε5 + ε6, ε1 + ε3 = ε9 + ε11, ε9 + ε10 = ε13 + ε14, ε5 + ε7 = ε13 + ε15,
ε3 + ε4 = ε7 + ε8, ε11 + ε12 = ε15 + ε16, ε2 + ε4 = ε10 + ε12, ε6 + ε8 = ε14 + ε16.
(19)
A convenient solution of the system (18, 19) is reported by Cereceda [70] to be the one for
which the set of probabilities υ = {ε2, ε3, ε6, ε7, ε10, ε11, ε13, ε16} is expressed in terms of the
remaining set of probabilities µ = {ε1, ε4, ε5, ε8, ε9, ε12, ε14, ε15} that is given as
ε2 = (1 − ε1 − ε4 + ε5 − ε8 − ε9 + ε12 + ε14 − ε15)/2,
ε3 = (1 − ε1 − ε4 − ε5 + ε8 + ε9 − ε12 − ε14 + ε15)/2,
ε6 = (1 + ε1 − ε4 − ε5 − ε8 − ε9 + ε12 + ε14 − ε15)/2,
ε7 = (1 − ε1 + ε4 − ε5 − ε8 + ε9 − ε12 − ε14 + ε15)/2,
ε10 = (1 − ε1 + ε4 + ε5 − ε8 − ε9 − ε12 + ε14 − ε15)/2,
ε11 = (1 + ε1 − ε4 − ε5 + ε8 − ε9 − ε12 − ε14 + ε15)/2,
ε13 = (1 − ε1 + ε4 + ε5 − ε8 + ε9 − ε12 − ε14 − ε15)/2,
ε16 = (1 + ε1 − ε4 − ε5 + ε8 − ε9 + ε12 − ε14 − ε15)/2.
(20)
This allows us to consider the elements of the set µ as independent variables.
In order to use the EPR setting to play the Bayesian game in Fig. 1, we call the observers 1
and 2 the players Alice and Bob, respectively, of the Bayesian game. We then associate one half of
the EPR pair to the player Alice and the other half to the player Bob. As Alice and Bob have two
directions each, we associate Alice’s two directions to the two types of Alice. That is D1 ∼Alice’s
type 1 and D2 ∼Alice’s type 2. Similarly, we associate Bob’s two directions to the two types of
Bob. That is D′1 ∼Bob’s type 1 and D′2 ∼Bob’s type 2.
With these associations, and in view of the game in Fig. 1, in a run, each of the two directions
D1 and D2 is chosen with probability
1
2 . Similarly, the directions D
′
1 and D
′
2 are chosen with
probabilities ω and (1 − ω), respectively. In view of the payoff relations (14) in the factorizable
game, the players’ payoff relations in the game with EPR probabilities can now be expressed as
ΠA1(εj) =
1
2
{(2)ε1 + (0)ε2 + (0)ε3 + (1)ε4}+ 1
2
{(2)ε5 + (0)ε6 + (0)ε7 + (1)ε8} ,
ΠA2(εj) =
1
2
{(0)ε9 + (2)ε10 + (1)ε11 + (0)ε12}+ 1
2
{(0)ε13 + (2)ε14 + (1)ε15 + (0)ε16} ,
ΠB1(εj) = ω {(1)ε1 + (0)ε2 + (0)ε3 + (2)ε4}+ (1− ω) {(1)ε9 + (0)ε10 + (0)ε11 + (2)ε12} ,
ΠB2(εj) = ω {(0)ε5 + (2)ε6 + (1)ε7 + (0)ε8}+ (1− ω) {(0)ε13 + (2)ε14 + (1)ε15 + (0)ε16} ,
(21)
where 1 ≤ j ≤ 16 and ΠA1(εj), ΠA2(εj), ΠB1(εj), and ΠB2(εj) are the payoffs to Alice of type 1,
Alice of type 2, Bob of type 1, and Bob of type 2, respectively, expressed in term of the probabilities
εj that are defined in (17).
Note that the payoffs (21) are reduced to the payoffs in the mixed-strategy game (14) when
the probability set εj (1 ≤ j ≤ 16) is factorizable in terms of the probabilities p, q, p′, q′ ∈ [0, 1]
as given by Eqs. (22).
5 Nash equilibrium inequalities in Bayesian game of Battle
of Sexes with EPR probabilities
So as to find the Nash equilibria when the probability set εj (1 ≤ j ≤ 16) are non-factorizable,
we notice that when εj are factorizable in terms of the probabilities p, q, p
′, and q′, we can write
ε1 = pp
′, ε2 = p(1− p′), ε3 = (1− p)p′, ε4 = (1− p)(1− p′),
ε5 = pq
′, ε6 = p(1− q′), ε7 = (1− p)q′, ε8 = (1− p)(1− q′),
ε9 = qp
′, ε10 = q(1− p′), ε11 = (1− q)p′, ε12 = (1− q)(1 − p′),
ε13 = qq
′, ε14 = q(1 − q′), ε15 = (1− q)q′, ε16 = (1− q)(1 − q′). (22)
With this the payoff relations (21) are reduced to the payoffs given by (14). Also, when εj are
factorizable, and can be expressed in terms of p, q, p′, and q′, they satisfy the constraints given by
Eqs. (18, 19) and p, q, p′, and q′ can then be expressed in terms of the probabilities εj as follows
p =
1
2
(ε1 + ε2 + ε5 + ε6), q =
1
2
(ε9 + ε10 + ε13 + ε14),
p′ =
1
2
(ε1 + ε3 + ε9 + ε11), q
′ =
1
2
(ε5 + ε7 + ε13 + ε15). (23)
From the set of inequalities (15), the expressions describing the Nash equilibria in the factorizable
game are
∂ΠA1
∂p
|∗ (p∗ − p) ≥ 0, ∂ΠA2
∂q
|∗ (q∗ − q) ≥ 0,
∂ΠB1
∂p′
|∗ (p′∗ − p′) ≥ 0, ∂ΠB2
∂q′
|∗ (q′∗ − q′) ≥ 0. (24)
To evaluate these inequalities, we use the relations (20) to express the payoff relations (21) in
terms of the elements from the set µ as follows
ΠA1(εj) =
1
2
(2ε1 + ε4 + 2ε5 + ε8),
ΠA2(εj) =
1
4
(3− ε1 + ε4 + ε5 − ε8 − 3ε9 − 3ε12 + 5ε14 + ε15),
ΠB1(εj) = ω(ε1 + 2ε4 − ε9 − 2ε12) + (ε9 + 2ε12)
ΠB2(εj) =
ω
2
(3 + ε1 − ε4 − 3ε5 − 3ε8 − ε9 + ε12 − 3ε14 − 3ε15) + (2ε14 + ε15). (25)
Similarly, using the relations (20), we express p, q, p′, q′ in (23) in terms of the elements from the
set µ as
p =
1
2
(1 + ε1 − ε4 + ε5 − ε8 − ε9 + ε12 + ε14 − ε15),
q =
1
2
(1− ε1 + ε4 + ε5 − ε8 + ε9 − ε12 + ε14 − ε15),
p′ =
1
2
(1 + ε1 − ε4 − ε5 + ε8 + ε9 − ε12 − ε14 + ε15),
q′ =
1
2
(1− ε1 + ε4 + ε5 − ε8 + ε9 − ε12 − ε14 + ε15). (26)
This allows us to use the chain rule to evaluate
∂ΠA1(εj)
∂p
=
∂ΠA1(εj)
∂ε1
∂ε1
∂p
+
∂ΠA1(εj)
∂ε4
∂ε4
∂p
+
∂ΠA1(εj)
∂ε5
∂ε5
∂p
+
∂ΠA1(εj)
∂ε8
∂ε8
∂p
+
∂ΠA1(εj)
∂ε9
∂ε9
∂p
+
∂ΠA1(εj)
∂ε12
∂ε12
∂p
+
∂ΠA1(εj)
∂ε14
∂ε14
∂p
+
∂ΠA1(εj)
∂ε15
∂ε15
∂p
,
(27)
that gives
∂ΠA1(εj)
∂p
= 2. Similarly, we obtain
∂ΠA2(εj)
∂q
= 4,
∂ΠB1(εj)
∂p′
= −2, ∂ΠB2(εj)
∂q′
= −2(2ω + 1). (28)
The inequalities (24) are now written as
2(p∗ − p) ≥ 0, 4(q∗ − q) ≥ 0,
−2(p′∗ − p′) ≥ 0, − 2(2ω + 1)(q′∗ − q′) ≥ 0, (29)
giving
p∗ =
1
2
(ε∗1 + ε
∗
2 + ε
∗
5 + ε
∗
6) = 1, q
∗ =
1
2
(ε∗9 + ε
∗
10 + ε
∗
13 + ε
∗
14) = 1,
p′∗ =
1
2
(ε∗1 + ε
∗
3 + ε
∗
9 + ε
∗
11) = 0, q
′∗ =
1
2
(ε∗5 + ε
∗
7 + ε
∗
13 + ε
∗
15) = 0, (30)
as a unique Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the game. Using Eqs. (23,26) we then obtain ε∗2 = ε
∗
6 =
ε∗10 = ε
∗
14 = 1 with all the rest of ε
∗
j being zeros. The players’ payoffs at this equilibrium are
obtained as
ΠA1(ε
∗
j ) = 0, ΠA2(ε
∗
j ) = 2, ΠB1(ε
∗
j ) = 0, ΠB2(ε
∗
j ) = 2, (31)
presenting a dramatic contrast to what is the case when the underlying probabilities are factoriz-
able.
6 Discussion
As is well known, Bell’s inequality presents stark difference between the classical and quantum
world. The CHSH form of Bell’s inequality can be expressed as a constraint on probabilities
without referring to the formalism and mathematical machinery of quantum mechanics. Game
theory is based on the theory of probability and this suggests that the quantum contents of
quantum games can be given an expression that only employ probabilities without referring to the
formalism of quantum mechanics. A probabilistic approach to quantum games is only a matter of
perspective as the quantum Bayesian game discussed in this paper can be physically implemented
using EPR type experiments that result in non-factorizable probabilities.
Essentially, this paper discusses a physical implementation of a quantum Bayesian game using
EPR experiments. We find that these experiments provide a natural setting for analyzing a
quantum Bayesian game. Our analysis uses only probabilities as they facilitate wider access to
the area of quantum games. The physical realization of our game is provided by actual EPR
experiments where quantum mechanics makes the difference and which can also be expressed in
terms of probabilities only.
We study the game of Battle of Sexes with incomplete information that has both pure and
mixed Bayesian Nash equilibria. We investigate the situation when the underlying probabilities of
this game can become non-factorizable. As is known, the probabilities in generalized EPR exper-
iments can become non-factorizable and in certain cases can maximally violate the corresponding
CHSH version of Bell’s inequality. When the quantum mechanical probabilities are factorizable
the game attains a classical interpretation. However, when the probabilities are allowed to be-
come non-factorizable, we find that the solution of the game turns out to be entirely different
and, in contrast to the classical game that has both pure and mixed Bayesian Nash equilibria, the
quantum game has a unique Bayesian Nash equilibrium.
A natural question to ask here is whether any set of probabilities that satisfies the constraints
(18,19) is physically realizable? Quantum mechanics is known to impose further constraints and
one such constraint is given by the CHSH version of Bell’s inequality [57, 69, 70]. This constraint
states that the quantity ∆ defined by
∆ = 2(ε1 + ε4 + ε5 + ε8 + ε9 + ε12 + ε14 + ε15 − 2) (32)
is restricted in the range |∆QM | ≤ 2
√
2 by the laws of quantum mechanics and the CHSH version of
Bell’s inequality is violated in quantum mechanical experiments when 2 < |∆|. These constraints
are imposed by physical realizations and a maximum value of ∆ = 4 emerges when only non-
negative probabilities are considered. It is known that this value is not physically realizable.
Our analysis for a Bayesian game of Battle of Sexes shows that when the underlying probabil-
ities are obtained from generalized EPR experiments, and thus can be non-factorizable, a unique
Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the game emerges. This equilibrium corresponds to ε∗2 = ε
∗
6 = ε
∗
10 =
ε∗14 = 1 with the remaining ε
∗
j being zeros. Substituting these values in Eq. (32) gives ∆ = −2 i.e.
the unique Bayesian Nash equilibrium is obtained without violating the CHSH version of Bell’s
inequality.
A particularly interesting situation would be when the violation of CHSH version of Bell’s
inequality leads to a new outcome of the game. Quantum mechanics is known to put its own
constraints on the allowed ranges of the variables (ε1 + ε2 + ε5 + ε6), (ε9 + ε10 + ε13 + ε14),
(ε1 + ε3 + ε9 + ε11), and (ε5 + ε7 + ε13 + ε15), as described in Eqs. (23), and they are different
from those imposed by just not permitting probabilities to have negative values. An important
question would then be to ask whether this would change or affect the outcome of the game. A
consideration of Eqs. (29, 30) shows that the conditions yielding the Bayesian Nash equilibrium
are simply too strong to be affected by extra constraints that quantum mechanics can impose on
the allowed ranges of the variables (ε1 + ε2 + ε5 + ε6), (ε9 + ε10 + ε13 + ε14), (ε1 + ε3 + ε9 + ε11),
and (ε5 + ε7 + ε13 + ε15). However, it is possible that for other Bayesian games the conditions
giving the outcome are not so strong and it then would be worthwhile to investigate this question
further.
Acknowledgement: We acknowledge helpful discussions with Andrew Allison.
7 Appendix A
Using the standard notation, the set of 16 probabilities in (17) is obtained from a pure state of
two qubits
|ψ0〉 = α |00〉+ β |01〉+ γ |10〉+ δ |11〉 (33)
where α, β, γ, δ ∈ C and |α|2 + |β|2 + |γ|2 + |δ|2 = 1. We assume that observer 1’s directions D1
and D2 are along the unit vectors aˆ and cˆ, respectively. Similarly, observer 2’s directions D
′
1 and
D′2 are along the unit vectors bˆ and dˆ, respectively. Without loss of generality, we also assume
that the unit vectors aˆ = [ax, ay], bˆ = [bx, by], cˆ = [cx, cy], and dˆ = [dx, dy] are all located in the
x-y plane. Observer 1’s measurement operators are then σˆ · aˆ and σˆ · cˆ, respectively. Similarly,
Observer 2’s measurement operators are σˆ · bˆ and σˆ · dˆ, respectively. Here σˆ = [σx, σy, σz] and
σx, σy, σz are Pauli spin matrices.
Consider the probability ε1 in the (17) that corresponds to observers 1 and 2 measuring along
the directions aˆ and bˆ, respectively, and both obtaining the outcome +1. For this situation, we
require the eigenstates of the operators (σˆ · aˆ) and (σˆ · bˆ), with the eigenvalue of +1 for both.
These are found to be
|0〉+(ax+iay)|1〉√
2
and
|0〉+(bx+iby)|1〉√
2
, respectively. From these the eigenstate
of the measurement operator (σˆ · aˆ)⊗ (σˆ · bˆ), with the eigenvalue +1, is obtained as
|ψ1〉 =
1
2
(|00〉+ (bx + iby) |01〉+ (ax + iay) |10〉+ (ax + iay)(bx + iby) |11〉), (34)
and the probability ε1 is then obtained from |〈ψ1| ψ0〉|2. For the pure state (33) this becomes
ε1 =
1
4
|α+ β(bx − iby) + γ(ax − iay) + δ(ax − iay)(bx − iby)|2 . (35)
Similarly, for the probability ε2, along with the eigenstate of (σˆ · aˆ) with eigenvalue +1 ob-
tained above, we require the eigenstate of the operator (σˆ · bˆ) with the eigenvalues −1, which is
|0〉−(bx+iby)|1〉√
2
. From these the eigenstate of the measurement operator (σˆ · aˆ) ⊗ (σˆ · bˆ), with the
eigenvalue −1, is obtained as
|ψ2〉 =
1
2
(|00〉 − (bx + iby) |01〉+ (ax + iay) |10〉 − (ax + iay)(bx + iby) |11〉), (36)
and, as before, the probability ε2 is then obtained from |〈ψ2| ψ0〉|2. For the pure state (33) this
becomes
ε2 =
1
4
|α− β(bx − iby) + γ(ax − iay)− δ(ax − iay)(bx − iby)|2 , (37)
and the remaining probabilities ε3, ε4...ε16 can be obtained similarly.
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